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approach will achieve a tax saving grossly disproportionate to any savings
achieved by deferral or reserves when the amount of the deposit retained is
taxable in full. 3
33 An illustration of this disproportion can be seen in the Bradford and the Warren cases
themselves. In the former, the taxpayer reported as income only approximately $53,000 of the
$185,000 it received. In the latter, where the lease had a shorter period to run, the taxpayer
reported $85,000 out of $125,000. It would seem highly improbable that this saving would be
offset by the taxpayer's gaining interest on deferred taxes, by his possible placement in a
lower tax bracket, and by possible loss of any deduction for expenses not accrued if in the future
year he should have no income.

"ORDINARY AND NECESSARY AND
LEGAL EXPENSES"
THE FEDERAL TAX AND STATE CRIMINAL LAW
I
The Internal Revenue Code provides that the "ordinary and necessary
expenses" of a trade or business may be deducted from gross income.' Although this provision does not explicitly condition deductibility upon legality,
the Tax Court and lower federal courts have over the years established
special rules for expenditures illegal in themselves or incurred in connection
2
with illegal activities.
With only a few exceptions, 3 the courts have disallowed deduction of penalties paid for violations of federal4 and state5 statutes and municipal ordinances. 6 Disallowance has been justified by some courts on the ground that
it is never ordinary and necessary to violate the law.7 Other courts have
I "There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or
incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, including-(l) a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually rendered; ...
(3) rentals. ..." Int. Rev. Code §162(a), 26 U.S.C.A. §162(a) (1954), formerly §23(a) (1) (A)
of the 1939 Code.
24 Mertens, The Law of Federal Income Taxation §25.131 et seq. (1954). With respect to
expenses incurred in connection with illegal activities, the problem of deductibility is raised
by the rule that income from such activities is taxable. United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S.
259 (1927). Contra: Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404 (1946), limited to its facts in Rutkin
v. United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952).
' ost of the exceptions involve non-wilful violation of maximum-price laws; e.g., Jerry
Rossman Corp. v. Comm'r, 175 F.2d 711 (C.A.2d, 1949).
4E.g., Great Northern Ry. v. Comm'r, 40 F.2d 373 (C.A. 8th, 1930), cert. denied 282 U.S.
855 (1930); David R. Faulk, 26 T.C. 948 (1956); Joseph Saltzman, 21 T.C. 777 (1954).
5E.g., Commissioner v. Longhorn Portland Cement Co., 148 F.2d 276 (C.A.5th, 1945);
Burroughs Building Material Co. v. Comm'r, 47 F.2d 178 (C.A.2d, 1931).
6Harry Wiedetz, 2 T.C. 1262 (1943).
7 E.g., Great Northern Ry. v. Comm'r, 40 F.2d 372 (C.A. 8th, 1930).
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argued that payment of a penalty is ordinary and necessary but the deduction must be denied if it would frustrate public policy by reducing the impact
of the penalty.

8

Deduction has also been uniformly denied for expenditures illegal in themselves, e.g., bribes paid to law enforcement officers for "protection," 9 purchases of liquor in violation of prohibition laws,10 and payments to obtain
political patronage." Denial of the deduction was usually based on the
ground that "the law will not recognize the necessity of engaging in illegal
courses in the conduct of a business."'1 2 Those expenses of an illegitimate
13
business which are not themselves illegal have been held to be deductible,
on the basis of the circular reasoning that the income tax should be a levy
on net, rather than gross, income.' 4 However, in cases involving the litigation
costs incurred by a trade or business in unsuccessfully defending a criminal
prosecution, the deduction has usually been denied,'

5

for a variety of reasons. 1 6

Before the October 1957 term the Supreme Court had never put its unqualified stamp of approval on any of these rules. In 1941, in Textile Mills
Corporationv. Commissioner,1 7 the Court disallowed the deduction of lobby8 E.g., David R. Faulk, 26 T.C. 948 (1956).
9E.g., Charles A. Clark, 19 T.C. 48 (1952); Frank A. Maddas, 40 B.T.A. 572 (1939),
others issues aff'd 114 F.2d 548 (C.A. 3d, 1940).
0 E.g., R. E. L. Finley, 27 T.C. 413 (1956); Lorraine Corp., 33 B.T.A. 1158 (1936); Cf.
Fuller v. Comm'r, 213 F.2d 102 (C.A. 10th, 1954).
" E.g., Easton Tractor & Equipment Co., 35 B.T.A. 189 (1936). See Textile Mills v. Cornm'r, 314 U.S. 326 (1941), discussed in text at note 17 infra.
12National Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Helvering, 89 F.2d 878, 881 (C.A. 2d, 1937).
"3E.g., G. A. Comeaux, 10 T.C. 201 (1948), aff'd sub nom. Cohen v. Comm'r, 176 F.2d
394 (C.A. 10th, 1949).
14 G. A. Comeaux, 10 T.C. 201, 207 (1948).
15E.g., David R. Faulk, 26 T.C. 948 (1956); Thomas A. Joseph, 26 T.C. 562 (1956); Simon
Bloom, 7 T.C.M. 517 (1948). In Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943), the Supreme Court allowed the deduction of expenses incurred in an unsuccessful attempt to enjoin
the Postmaster General from imposing a fraud order. This case has been interpreted as inapplicable to expenses incurred in fighting criminal prosecutions; e.g., Thomas A. Joseph,
26 T.C. 562, 564 (1956).
6The Tax Court has stated the usual reasons: "The fees were not incurred in the actual
production of the income of the illegal business and did not enable him to continue his gambling business.... The petitioner would reduce the cost of unsuccessfully defending himself
against a criminal charge by deducting the expense from his taxable income and thus, in
effect, have the federal government assist in his defense. The allowance of the deduction would
be against public policy. The amount is not an ordinary and necessary expense of any business
regularly carried on by the taxpayer." C. W. Thomas, 16 T.C. 1417, 1418 (1951). One court,
having decided on public policy grounds that penalties could not be deducted, held that "the
legal expenses incurred in litigating the question whether the taxpayer violated the law and
whether fines should be imposed should naturally fall with the fines themselves." Burroughs
Building Material Co. v. Comm'r, 47 F.2d 178, 180 (C.A. 2d, 1931).
1 314 U.S. 326 (1941).
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ing expenses, but the decision was based on the congressional re-enactment of
the business expense section at a time when a Treasury regulation under that
section had for "many" years disallowed such deductions. Two years later the
Court, in Commissioner v. Heininger,18 allowed the deduction of attorney
fees paid in an unsuccessful resistance to the Postmaster General's issuance
of a fraud order which would have destroyed the taxpayer's business. The
Court noted that "[t]he language of §23(a) [now §162(a)] contains no express reference to the lawful or unlawful character of the business expenses
which are declared to be deductible."' 9 The rules developed by the lower
courts for illegal items, the Court said, "narrowed the generally accepted
meaning of the language used in §23 (a) .'20 The Heininger decision, moreover, involved an assumption which is contrary to that of many of the decisions of the lower courts, namely that a business which engages in defrauding the public may have ordinary and necessary expenses. 21
In 1952 the Court, in the Lilly case,22 again expressed reservations about
conditioning deductibility upon legality. It was assumed "for the sake of
argument" that some expenses could not be deducted because public policy
would thereby be frustrated. 23 But the Court did not pass on the validity of
the assumption because it decided that the deduction sought-for kickbacks
paid by an optical firm to physicians who referred patients to it-did not
frustrate public policy.
In three cases decided during the October, 1957 term the Supreme Court
squarely faced for the first time the question of whether legality should be
a criterion of deductibility. Two cases, both unanimously decided, involved
fines paid by trucking firms for violating state maximum weight laws. In
Tank Truck Rentals v. Commissioner24 the taxpayer had incurred a large
number of penalties when it deliberately overloaded its trucks as an alternative to economic suicide.25 A few violations in the Tank Truck case and all
in Hoover Motor Express Co. v. United States2" were inadvertent. Speaking
20
18 320 U.S. 467 (1943).
11Id., at 474.
Id., at 473.
21 See Paul, The Use of Public Policy by the Commissioner in Disallowing Deductions,
1954 So. Cal. Tax. Inst. 715, 733.
22 Lilly v. Comm'r 343 U.S. 90 (1952).
23Id., at 94.
24356 U.S. 30 (1958), aff'g 242 F.2d 14 (C.A. 3d, 1957), aff'g 26 T.C. 427 (1956).
25"In order to have carried weights within the limitations of the Pennsylvania statute,
petitioner [Tank Truck Rentals, Inc.] would have had to reduce its revenue per gallon hauled,
while operating costs would have increased because of the additional number of trips required,
thus causing petitioner to operate at a loss. Petitioner could not have increased its rental charge
to its lessees per gallon hauled to compensate for transporting a smaller number of gallons each
trip, since the competitive practices in the industry were such that had petitioner demanded
an increased rental from its lessees, while the industry generally was filling its tanks to capacity
and exceeding the Pennsylvania weight limitations, petitioner would have forced itself out
of business." Tank Truck Rentals, Inc., 26 T.C. 427, 433-34 (1956).
2356 U.S. 38 (1958), aff'g 241 F.2d 459 (C.A. 6th, 1957), aff'g 135 F.Supp. 818 (D.C.

Tenn., 1955).
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through Mr. Justice Clark, the Court held that Congress would not be presumed to have intended to allow deductions which would reduce the impact
of state-imposed penalties and thus frustrate state public policy. Therefore
the expenses could not be deemed "necessary" within the meaning of the
tax law.2 7 Frustration of state policy, the Court was careful to say, is not to
result automatically in disallowance. Rather, "the test of nondeductibility
always is the severity and immediacy of the frustration resulting from allowance of the deduction."2 8 In the Court's view, this test plainly proscribes
deduction when the expenditure is in itself illegal; the frustration resulting
from deduction of state-imposed penalties seemed to the Court only slightly
more remote and well within the class of nondeductible items. The Court
refused to distinguish between deliberate and inadvertent violations on the
ground that the state statutes prohibited both alike.
In Commissioner v. Sullivan,2 9 also unanimously decided, the Court held
that bookmakers could deduct wages and rent paid in violation of the Illinois
Criminal Code. The opinion, by Mr. Justice Douglas, pointed out that a
Treasury ruling made the federal excise tax on bets deductible as a business
expense. It was concluded that the "policy that allows as a deduction the tax
paid to conduct the business seems sufficiently hospitable to allow the normal
deductions of the rent and wages necessary to operate it." 30 Moreover, the
expenses sought to be deducted, the Court indicated, bore only a remote
relation to the illegal act. The Court also argued that disallowance of the
deduction would "come close" to taxing the business on the basis of gross,
rather than net, income.
II
The Tank Truck, Hoover and Sullivan cases seem to have left much of the
prior case law unchanged. The lower courts' rule disallowing deduction of
fines was adopted in the Tank Truck and Hoover cases. The exception created
27 In the Hoover case the Court undertook an exploration of the facts in order to determine
whether the violations were "necessary." The Court concluded that because the violations
could have been prevented had the taxpayer properly distributed its cargo and carried scales
in its trucks to weigh merchandise picked up between terminals the violations were unnecessary. This is hardly the sort of examination which courts have conducted where the expenses
were not tinged with illegality. The Court does not rest on this point but holds further that the
expenses were not necessary because their deduction would, as in the Tank Truck case, frustrate public policy.
28 Tank Truck Rentals v. Comm'r, 356 U.S. 30, 35 (1958).
29356 U.S. 27 (1958), aff'g the combined cases of Neil Sullivan and Grace Sullivan, James
Ross and Ann Ross v. Comm'r, 241 F.2d 46 (C.A. 7th, 1957) and Sam Mesi v. Comm'r, 242
F.2d 558 (C.A. 7th, 1957), rev'g respectively, 15 T.C.M. 23 (1956) and 25 T.C. 513 (1955).
30 Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27, 29 (1958).
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by the lower courts for exactions which are not punitive in nature has
apparently been preserved.3 2 In none of the cases was there any disapproval
of the doctrines developed by the lower courts with respect to the expenses
of an illegitimate business which are not in themselves illegal or the exception
made for expenditures incurred in unsuccessfully defending a criminal prose33
cution.
With respect to expenditures illegal in themselves there is, at least on the
surface, a contradiction between the Tank Truck and Sullivan cases. In a
strong dictum in the former case Mr. Justice Clark stated, "Certainly the
frustration of state policy is most complete and direct when the expenditure
for which deduction is sought is itself prohibited by statute." 34 In the Sullivan
case, however, although the Court expressly recognized 3 5 the Tax Court's finding36 that the expenditures sought to be deducted were in violation of a state
statute, deduction was allowed. In the opinion Mr. Justice Douglas did not
address himself to a reconciliation of the Sullivan case with the Tank Truck
dictum. But there are several grounds on which the Sullivan case may arguably be limited in order to minimize the contradiction. The Court may have
intended to limit the holding in Sullivan to expenditures of businesses like
gambling which pay a deductible federal excise tax. 37 However, there is some
indication in the opinion that the Court intended to lay down a broader holding; the other grounds given by the Court are broadly applicable to all expenditures connected with illegal business activity.
It may be argued that the Court intended to limit the Sullivan case to wage
and rent expenses. The Court may have thought that wages and rent normally
constitute such a large percentage of the expenses of a business that to prevent
31E.g., Jerry Rossman Corp. v. Comm'r, 175 F.2d 711 (C.A. 2d, 1949). See Deductibiity of Business Expenses and the Frustration of Public Policy, 38 Va. L. Rev. 771, 782-85
(1952); Public Policy and Federal Income Tax Deductions, 51 Col. L. Rev. 752, 753-54 (1951).
32In the Tank Truck opinion Mr. Justice Clark stated, "Petitioner's reliance on Jerry Rossman Corp. v. Commissioner... is misplaced. Deductions were allowed the taxpayer in that
case for amounts inadvertently collected by him as OPA overcharges and then paid over to
the Government, but the allowance was based on the fact that the Administrator, in applying
the Act, had differentiated between willful and innocent violators. No such differentiation
exists here, either in the application or the literal language of the state maximum weight
laws." Tank Truck Rentals v. Comm'r, 356 U.S. 30, 36-37 (1958).
33The courts' allowance of deductions for the legitimate expenses of illegal businesses and
disallowance of deductions for the cost of unsuccessful defense of a criminal prosecution seem
difficult to justify under the remoteness of frustration test adopted in the Tank Truck case.
However, the Court in the Tank Truck case did not refer to these expenses. The distinction
seems justifiable in light of certain underlying policies in the field. See note 49 infra.
4Tank Truck Rentals v. Comm'r, 356 U.S. 30, 35 (1958).
35Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27, 28 (1958).
3 James Ross v. Comm'r, 15 T.C.M. 23 (1956); Sam Mesi v. Comm'r, 25 T.C. 513 (1955).
37See text at note 30 supra.
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their deduction results in taxation of gross income. However, denial of any
deduction results in a partial taxation of gross income. It is not obvious that
deductibility should depend on the extent to which gross income is taxed.
Moreover, in some businesses the other illegal expenditures or the fines may,
for any particular year, approximate or even exceed wage or rent expenses.
It is also arguable that the Court thought that there is a category of expenditures which, like wages and rent, are so indispensable to the operation of
any business that, regardless of illegality, deduction should be permitted. This
categorization is similar to that inherent in the "economic integrality" test
developed by the Seventh Circuit in Commissioner v. Doyle.38 In explaining
its test the Court of Appeals distinguished "integral" from "concomitant" expenditures. Wages paid by a grocer to his employees were said to be "integral"; the grocer's bribe of a policeman to allow an illegal display of wares on
the sidewalk was termed "concomitant." "Integral," but not "concomitant,"
expenditures were said to be deductible. Neither this categorization nor the
one which may be used to limit the Sullivan opinion seems warranted by the
statute. Moreover, in view of the great variety of fact situations that will
arise, it would seem extremely difficult to establish categories of expenses
accurately reflecting the degree to which any particular expense is "indispensable."
The apparent contradiction between the Sullivan and Tank Truck cases disappears if the former is interpreted as dealing only with expenditures not
illegal in themselves. 39 Except for one reference to the Tax Court's findings,
the Supreme Court carefully avoided describing the expenditures. Under this
interpretation the Sullivan case indicates the Court's approval of the lower
court cases allowing deduction for those expenditures of illegitimate businesses
which are not illegal in themselves. This interpretation rests on the questionable assumption that the Court deliberately disregarded its knowledge of the
character of the expenditures. But any other interpretation means that the
Court deliberately disregarded the clear language of the Tank Truck opinion.
This dilemma may reflect a basic disagreement which, despite the unanimity
of the opinions, perhaps exists within the Court. Thus the language used by
Mr. Justice Douglas in reconciling the cases is somewhat equivocal:
The amounts paid as wages to employees and to the landlord as rent are "ordinary
and necessary expenses" in the accepted meaning of the words. That is enough to
permit the deduction, unless it is clear that the allowance is a device to avoid the
consequences of violations of a law, [citing the Hoover and Tank Truck cases] or
38 231 F.2d 635 (C.A. 7th, 1956). "We construe the statutory words 'ordinary and necessary expenses' to mean those expenses which economically are an integral part of a business,
whether it be lawful or unlawful. Integrality is the test." Id., at 637.
39 This explanation is suggested in Surrey & Warren, Comment to Commissioner v. Sullivan, CCH Federal Taxation: Current Law and Practice §1229 (1958).
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otherwise contravenes the federal policy expressed in a statute or regulation ....
(Italics added.)

40

It is arguable that one of the statutes meant by Mr. Justice Douglas was the
very section of the Revenue Code under consideration; by this interpretation
the allowance of certain deductions might be said to contravene a federal
statute because the related acts were prohibited by state law. This analysis,
however, is circular and provides no way to distinguish between fines and
other expenditures. Alternatively, the language may suggest disagreement in
the Court over the wisdom of the Tank Truck case; it seems doubtful that the
deductions sought in that case could be considered to contravene a "federal
policy expressed in a statute or regulation," despite Justice Douglas' use of
the word "otherwise." This interpretation derives support from the fact that
the Court failed to follow its usual practice of assigning companion cases to
the same Justice4 l and instead divided the cases between two Justices who had
previously split over the use of the federal income tax to enforce state criminal
laws. 42 It seems reasonable, then, to consider the Sullivan case broadly, as holding that deductions may be taken for expenditures illegal in themselves.
III
The doctrine that the illegal character of an expenditure is relevant in determining deductibility has no justification in the language of the Revenue
Code. The requirement of that statute is that the expense must be ordinary
and necessary. 43 This has been interpreted to mean that the expense must be
in aid of or proximately resulting from the taxpayer's business and must be
customary for the type of enterprise. 44 The test thus seems to be the relation
of the expenditure to the business; that relation seems unaffected by the fact
that the expenditure itself, or the business or transaction in connection with
40 Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27,29 (1958). Justice Douglas' languageindicates that
in his opinion the expenses in the Tank Truck cases were ordinary and necessary within the
meaning of the statute but were disallowed on the basis of an additional test; this is contrary to
Justice Clark's approach in the Tank Truck case. Justice Douglas' approach seems preferable
because it represents more accurately the fact that the courts in certain types of cases will read
the word "legal" into the statute as an additional requirement. The Tank Truck case provides
an apt illustration: the fines incurred in preference to economic extinction and paid as a result
of governmental coercion must be deemed necessary if the word is to have any real meaning.
41In the October, 1957 term, for example, the Court followed this practice in the following
sets of cases: Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957) and Rathbun v. United States,
355 U.S. 107 (1957); Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373 (1958) and Safeway
Stores, Inc. v. Vance, 355 U.S. 389 (1958); Detroit v. Murray Corporation of America, 355
U.S. 489 (1958), United States v. Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958) and United States v. Muskegon,
355 U.S. 484 (1958).
4 Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952).

43 See note 1 supra.
44 Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933); 4
Mertens, The Law of Federal Income Taxation §25.09 (1954).
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which it is incurred, is prohibited by statute or regulation. Judges have at
times failed to recognize this fact and have argued that it is never brdinary
and necessary to violate the law and, therefore, that the expenses involved
cannot be ordinary and necessary. However, although it may be unnecessary
and extraordinary to run a gambling enterprise, if one is operated it may be
necessary and, one suspects, ordinary to pay the police for "protection." Similar analysis demonstrates the weakness of the Tank Truck case in conditioning deductibility upon the expected effect of the deduction.
It is difficult to find any justification in the legislative history for the courts'
distortion of the words "ordinary and necessary" in cases involving illegality.
Congress has at least twice refused to phrase the statute so as to disallow
illegal items.45 Moreover, on those occasions when Congress has intended to
use the tax laws as an additional sanction for violations of other laws it has
expressly spelled out its intention. 46
If, despite the statutory language, illegality is to be relevant in determining whether an expenditure may be deducted, the line drawn by the Supreme
Court between fines and other expenditures seems proper. First, disallowance
of deductions for many other expenditures might tend to discourage a taxpayer from filing a return, thus depriving the government of revenue. 47 The
extent of discouragement would depend primarily on two factors: (1) the size
of the disallowed expense in relation to the size of gross income and (2) the
ease with which the expenditures may be concealed among deductible items on
the return. Wage and rent expenses are both large and usually difficult to conceal. In most cases fines are probably smaller but perhaps more difficult to
hide. Most other items are usually smaller than wages and rent and probably
less difficult to report in some deductible category. Thus inability to deduct
wages and rent may often result in a tax exceeding profits; the taxpayer
would be presented with the choice of going out of business or failing to
report income. Inability to deduct fines would raise the tax bill, but usually
not to a prohibitive level. The theoretical inability to deduct expenditures
such as bribes may be effectively nullified by reporting them as other types of
45

Deductibility of Illegal Expenses under Section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code: A
justification for Vagueness, 66 Yale L. J. 602 n. 2 (1957).
46See Paul, op. cit. supra note 21, at 731 n. 38.
4 The likelihood that a taxpayer would be discouraged from filing a return would be increased if the courts, having disallowed deduction of an illegal expenditure, carry their campaign of discouraging crime one step further by deciding that the consideration for the expenditure will not be recognized. If this is done, the payment will be taxable as a gift. Int.
Rev. Code §2512(b), 26 U.S.C.A. §2512(b) (1954). Since the payment of the gift tax is nondeductible, there would be discouragement of crime with a vengeance-if the taxpayer filed
a return. The courts might balk at this step on the ground that the tax laws are to be adjusted
only to prevent encouragement of crimes, not to positively discourage it. However, the encouragement resulting from a failure to tax an illegal expenditure as a gift is just as real as the
encouragement resulting from a deduction of the expense. Moreover, unlike the refusal to
allow a deduction for income tax purposes, the imposition of a gift tax would be based on an
explicit statutory provision.
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expenses. These considerations lend some support to the possibility of distinguishing wages and rent from expenditures likely to be smaller. However, other
considerations lead to the conclusion that it is preferable to draw the line
between penalties and all other expenditures.
Disallowance of deduction for fines does not present the administrative
problems raised by disallowance of other items involving illegality. In the latter case the Commissioner would be required to keep track of a multitude of
ever-changing statutes and to determine whether any of them had been violated. This determination would raise the question of whether the taxpayer
was being penalized for an alleged crime without a trial conducted under the
safeguards of the Sixth Amendment. Disallowance would create these problems even if it is to be used only to discourage violations of federal statutes
and regulations. If the policy of discouragement includes state statutes and
regulations the Commissioner's task of keeping track of violations is herculean. Moreover, most states have many statutes, e.g., "Sunday blue laws,"
which they do not wish to enforce. Enforcement of such laws through the
federal tax would hardly aid state policy. Yet nobody knows which laws a
state "means" to enforce, and to give the Commissioner power to choose
would involve an extremely broad range of administrative discretion. If, in
addition, violations of public policy which are not even expressed in a statute
or regulation are grounds for disallowing a deduction, the Commissioner's
function will approach that of a censor of morals. 48 These problems are not
raised by disallowing deduction of penalties.
Another ground for distinguishing between fines and other expenditures is
the difference in state policies involved. In the case of fines, it could be said
that the policy frustrated by allowing a deduction is to make the violator
poorer by a precisely defined amount; in the case of other expenses it is a
more amorphous policy to deter some illegal activity such as gambling. The
frustration in the former case could be considered more certain and more
sharply defined. However, it may be argued that the policy of imposing a certain penalty is actually only a means to implement a policy of deterring the
penalized activity. Allowance of an expenditure incurred in connection with
an illegal activity encourages the crime and thereby reduces the deterrent impact of state law fully as much as disallowance of a fine of equivalent size
imposed on the activity. Thus allowance of a deduction for $10,000 in expenses decreases the cost of running an illegal business by the same amount as
allowance of a deduction for $10,000 in penalties decreases the cost of engaging in the penalized activity. Nevertheless, while the state's primary policy
is to deter the illegal activity, deduction of fines may result in direct frustra18 The Court indicated its recognition of the danger of giving the Commissioner too much
discretion in Lilly v. Comm'r, 343 U.S. 90 (1952). However, in a footnote to the Tank
Truck case the Court seems to retreat from the implication in the Lilly decision that the public
policy must be declared by a statute or regulation. Tank Truck Rentals v. Comm'r, 356 U.S.
30, 34 n. 6 (1958).
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tion of a subsidiary policy to make variations in a fine depend on the nature
of the violation. If fines could be deducted the loss occasioned by the fine
would vary according to the tax bracket of the violator, whether he had net
income for the year, and his loss carryover and carryback position-purely
fortuitous circumstances from the state's point of view. Of course, the state
could make its system of fines dependent on the federal income tax law; but
this might be too complicated, if only because federal tax laws change so
rapidly. Disallowance of deductions for fines seems preferable, 49 if the lack of
statutory justification for such a course is to be disregarded.
In accordance with the language of Mr. Justice Douglas in the Sullivan case,
another line of distinction might be suggested. One criticism of cases disallowing deduction on the grounds of illegality has been that it is not the function
of the federal government to enforce state criminal law.50 It may be that the
distinction between fines and other expenses implicit in the Tank Truck and
Sullivan cases reflects this concern for federal-state relations. Thus disallowance of deduction for fines merely aids an enforcement which has already
taken place, rather than constituting independent enforcement of state law.
However, problems of federalism would not be raised by disallowance of deduction for expenses incurred in connection with violation of federal law.
Thus a double line of distinction may emerge from the Sullivan, Tank Truck,
and Hoover cases: where violation of state law is involved, only deduction of
fines will be disallowed; where federal law is violated, the prior case law will
be followed.
41The cost of an unsuccessful defense of a criminal prosecution is an exception to the suggested rule of allowing deduction of all expenditures other than penalties. Litigation costs are
likely to be closer to the magnitude of fines than of wage and rent expenditures. Thus, although
it may be difficult to conceal a large portion of the litigation expenses, disallowance of such
expenses would probably not discourage filing of returns. Moreover, no substantial administrative problems are involved in determining when litigation expenses have been incurred, and a
policy of disallowance would not give the Commissioner the broad discretion to which the
Court in the Lilly case seemed to object. However, although the disallowance of fines frustrates state policy to make the violator poorer by the amount of the fine, there is no comparable
policy regarding litigation expenses.
50See Paul, op. cit. supra note 21.

THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY PROVISION OF WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION ACTS-DISTRIBUTION OF RISK BETWEEN A CONCURRENTLY NEGLIGENT EMPLOYER AND THIRD PARTY
Where the concurrent negligence of an employer and a third party cause
injury to an employee, the majority of courts have made the third party bear
the whole of the liability.' Thus, in suits against third parties by subrogated
1 (a) Subrogee-emrployerv. ThirdParty Cases:Aetna Casualty & S. Co. v. Manufacturers Cas.
Ins. Co., 140 F.Supp. 579 (W.D. La., 1956); Cyr v. F. S. Payne Co., 112 F.Supp. 526 (D. Conn.,
1953); Nyquist v. Batcher, 235 Minn. 491, 51 N.W.2d 566 (1952); Milosevich v. Pacific

